

PHILOSOPHY OF ART, ART HISTORY, AND CONTEMPORARY ART GO BEYOND AESTHETICS

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Abstract

In debates of art, the term "contemporary" is commonly used to refer to more nebulous, universal concepts such as "the current situation" or "contemporaneity." Often, brief citations of significant works by philosophers such as Giorgio Agamben, Jacques Rancière, and Peter Osborne serve as indicators of the boundaries of theoretical discourse. Before analyzing what these three current theorists have recently said about contemporaneity in general, contemporary art in particular, and the connections between the two, this article explains how I want to approach these subjects. Authors who have made significant contributions to these dialogues, such as artist-theorist Jean-Phillipe Antoine, Néstor Garca Canclini, and Jean-Luc Nancy, are also discussed. The analysis progresses from Agamben's poetic reference to "contemporariness" as a Nietzschean experience of "untimeliness" in relation to one's times, through Nancy's emphasis on art's constant return to its roots, Rancière's attribution of disagreement to the current regime of art, Osborne's adamant assertion of the "post-conceptual" nature of contemporary art, to Canclini's preference for historical art. When presentist immanence attempts to be inclusive, it is essential to restate Antoine's instruction to artists and others to "weave together a particular variety of periods" and to reflect on history.

Keywords: contemporaneity; contemporary; art; time; temporalities; modernity; modernism; post-conceptual; presentism.

Introduction

Recent interest in openly philosophical debates of art links to what Jean-Marie Schaeffer has termed a larger "legitimation dilemma" in contemporary art. It is logical to suppose that the present resurgence of philosophy is a result of its deep cultural effect (Fukuyama, 1992). However, it has contributed to intellectual life in a variety of ways beyond ideology alone. Schaeffer's delayed optimism that "art itself... will get along fairly well on its own" may no longer hold true in the absence of critical debate. The "artistic act" may be "irreducible to the technology through which it legitimizes itself," but this does not imply that the discourses from which it takes inspiration are invariably philosophical (Harvey, 1991). Regardless of what else one may believe, all lingering misconceptions regarding conceptual art have been definitively eradicated. In reality, Arthur Danto and others have revived the notion that art has attained its pinnacle, given that philosophy is intrinsic to modern art. This assertion, however, could be viewed as an inverted (disavowed) admission of the failure of the dominant philosophical discourse on art, namely "aesthetics," to adequately capture the unique characteristics of contemporary art: an implicit admission of inadequacy turned aggressively outwards into a judgment against its cause, against the claim of such art to the hallowed signifier "art" in its

previously accepted dominant historical-philosophical form. Danto refers to this type of artwork as "post-historical"(Griffin, 2011).

Artistic and Philosophical Critique

Schaeffer elaborates on his thesis that "the speculative tradition," which he defines as includes Heidegger and Jena Romanticism, has harmed art from its inception in the early 19th century. According to Schaeffer, the philosophical sacralization of art by the Romantic movement at the close of the 18th century had a delayed impact on the legitimacy problem that the modern art industry is now confronting. As a treatment, he proposes metaphysical disinvestment, sometimes known as the intellectual "desacralization" of art. The recommended diagnosis and treatment strategy are absolutely incorrect, despite the fact that I believe this etiology to be mostly accurate. Because the dispute over artistic authenticity illustrates the pervasive, if misplaced, the criticality of modern art. It demonstrates that worries regarding the worth of art and its importance to society are still pertinent today, themes for which the lasting but nebulous metaphysical component of art is a conceptual need (Smith, 2016).

Danto and Schaeffer are two contemporary philosophers that occasionally contribute negatively to the art discussion. The logical positivist and the Hegelian positivist are both positivists, but coming from different schools. In reaction to the Anglo-American enthusiasm for "post-structuralism," a drive towards the conceptual depth of the post-Kantian European tradition has emerged (already a categorial interest in a philosophical setting). Consequently, Adorno's Aesthetic Theory is obtaining a more and more hostile reception in the British context (Smith, 2009). However, it goes much beyond this by including Heideggerian, Merleau-Pontean, and postphenomenological notions, particularly those of Lyotard, Derrida, and Deleuze. The role of art in the German idealist philosophies of the 18th and 19th centuries, particularly those of Kant, Hegel, and the Romantics, as well as those of Schelling and, to a lesser extent, Schopenhauer, has therefore been the subject of increased research. This provides background for Schaeffer's anti-Romantic argument in English.

Clearly, this tradition's revival has been at least partially a conservative cultural phenomenon; it has been "against" cultural studies and "against" some "popular" but "difficult" forms of modern art. It has also played a vital role in highlighting problems that are often ignored by the sociology and semiotic reductionism of the majority of cultural-theoretical approaches. These considerations are crucial to the notion of art and how it varies from other cultural forms of representation. These concerns must be resolved if the paucity of theoretically challenging contemporary art criticism is to be remedied. This use of the European philosophical heritage as a framework for art-critical discourse has not yet succeeded in building a solid theoretical underpinning for contemporary art. It has not addressed the crucial historical transformations in the ontology of the artwork represented by this piece, shifts that are fundamental to its own contemporaneity (Danto, 1998). If one observes, for instance, the rising number of international biennale or Documenta, there is nothing that the bulk of philosophers who write on art can interact with practically, at least in a manner that critically addresses the discourses and concerns of the art world. (However, some contemporary video art is improving in a similar

way.) As a result, the intellectual discourse around the "death of art" has been reactive, and justifiable, but ultimately futile. This can only be seen as a philosophical resentment against art and, ultimately, contemporaneity itself (Giorgio, 2005).

These philosophical discourses on art provide a theoretical challenge to the bulk of contemporary art writing, since the semiotic discourses of the cultural theory are incapable of addressing problems like "aesthetic," evaluation, or the ontology of the artwork (Giorgio, 1998). However, they have often failed to give solutions to their own problems that are independent of previous works of art. When they do not announce the end of art, they can only provide a careful recoding of its objectives. In the last decade, Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty's writings have acquired prominence and begun to influence a range of creative genres.

I believe there are two reasons for this cognitive incapacity to appreciate contemporary art in light of its contemporaneity and, therefore, its striking difference from earlier art. Firstly, for a very long time, the terms "art as aesthetic" and "art as ontology," which were used to describe the two major philosophical discourses on art that emerged at the end of the 18th century, have been misunderstood (or, at worst, merely called) art as aesthetic and art as ontology (art as an ontologically distinct object of experience – specifically, the site of an autonomous production of meaning and a distinctive modality of truth). Second, it may be challenging to evaluate the notion of art from both a philosophical and historical perspective, particularly when contemplating the future (Danto, 1964).

For the first of these reasons, "aesthetics" (sthetik) has been and continues to be the official term for the philosophical study of art. In the 1820s, it had grown so widespread in Germany that even Hegel, who had conceded its inappropriateness at the opening of his Lectures on the Philosophy of Art, gave in (Mitchell, 2016). More than 150 years of deterioration have nearly completely buried the hillside. The second argument relates to the dehistoricizing effects of "aesthetic" as well as a more general inability to pay attention to the performative part of the temporal logic of historical totalization, which is essential to the critical act of judging. This comparison between the qualitative historical temporality of critical judgement (judgments of art that are also judgments of contemporaneity) and the chronological historical temporality of historicism reveals the crucial distinction between "the art history that art criticism (ideally) is" and the art history of the (traditional) art historian, for whom the concept of art is not itself at issue (comparatism).

Rather than aesthetic or conceptual knowledge, however, contemporary awareness of art serves as the foundation of art history and art criticism. Reexamining the link between Jena Romanticism and Kant's beliefs is key to accomplishing this. I will argue that only a critical discourse grounded in an early Romantic philosophy of art, as opposed to one grounded in Kantianism, Heideggerianism, or semiotics, is conceptually capable of understanding contemporary art, which is historically classified as post-conceptual art, a form of reflective mediation of concepts and affects (Jones, 2016).

Art Against Aesthetics (or, Romanticism contra Kant)

Why is it consequently inappropriate to refer to art as "aesthetic"? What is wrong with comparing "aesthetics" to art's theoretical foundations? In Critical Fragments number forty (1798) by Friedrich Schlegel, the issue is initially stated in the following example formulation: The employment of the term "aesthetic" in Germany stands out as it indicates absolute ignorance of both the issue and the language. Why does it still exist? (Harvey, 1991)

What does it mean for anything to be uttered with "equally complete ignorance"?

Nothing less would appear to be acceptable, it would seem, than what Kant himself condemned in his famous footnote to the Transcendental Aesthetic of his Criticism of Pure Reason (1781), namely its usage by "the Germans... to signify that which others term the criticism of taste." This section is parodistically referenced or altered in Schlegel's fragment. Its reference to "ignorance of the language" is closely related to Kant's advice to "desist" from using the term "aesthetic" to describe the critique of taste in order to "save it for that doctrine which is true science" (thus coming closer to the language and sense of the ancients, among whom the division of cognition into *aisthéta* and *noéta* [things of sensibility and things of the mind]). Kant's Transcendental Aesthetic, which is the first component of the Transcendental Doctrine of Elements [of knowledge] in the Critique of Pure Reason, is the philosophy to which he references in the relevant passage. Instead of concentrating on taste, it shows space and time as basic intuitions that restrict our capacity to view things more widely.

Nine years later, in 1790, Kant released the first portion of his Critique of Judgement-Power, titled "Critique of Aesthetic Judgement-Power," in which he significantly contradicted himself. This is one of the hilarious aspects of Schlegel's alteration. In-depth analysis of aesthetic judgements—specifically, judgments of taste—was presented in this area. The fatal legacy of the notion that "aesthetics" is a philosophical discourse about art is largely attributable to this text's reception, with its apparent confirmation of the legitimacy of integrating the three (originally independent) discourses of beauty, sensibility, and art into a single philosophical whole. The reader may take Schlegel's reference to Kant's previous work in section xvi as a reference to this paragraph, given Kant's apparent final acceptance of Baumgarten's use. By making fun of the first Critique and, by extension, Kant's self-awareness, he is at the very least highlighting Kant's inconsistency or shift in perspective. When Schlegel bragged in xvii about the success of the "German" usage of "aesthetic," a philosophical victory of a different and higher order, a win of art over philosophy inside metaphysics itself, was developing in the Romantic philosophy of art.

However, Kant intended his Critique of Judgment to be an aesthetic victory over systematic philosophy, not an art criticism triumph. In terms of the metaphysical movement from systematic philosophy to Romantic art criticism, "aesthetics" functions as a vanishing intermediary. To comprehend the distinction created here between aesthetics and art criticism, it is necessary to examine Kant's apparent contradiction between the two meanings of "aesthetic."

The requirement that the word aesthetic only be used in its "original" sense, which pertains to the perceptual component of knowledge, and its wider use, which pertains to evaluations of taste, seem to be in conflict. Kant asserts that the error of extension is caused by the "failed

hope" of "bringing the critical estimation of the beautiful under principles of reason and elevating its rules to a science," that is, from the desire for a rational doctrine of the beautiful to a "aesthetics" in the disciplinary sense. This goal drove Baumgarten's attempt to conceal the philosophical discussion over beauty by introducing the concept of rational knowing. Based on the "uselessness" of this objective, Kant judged that the application was invalid since "the established norms or criteria are essentially empirical in terms of their origins." Kant's argument in the Critique of Pure Reason focuses less on the relationship between beauty and sensibility than on the notion that the region in which they are connected (taste judgments) may be susceptible to "a priori laws." xviii Therefore, Kant consistently used the word "aesthetic" to refer to a particular category of philosophical art and a component of the theory (Lehre) of knowing. Not because it is not "rational," but because it is, beauty should not have been used to describe taste. As a result, all of its findings are empirical. Why did Kant eventually alter his mind?

He did not, at least in relation to this specific issue. Despite the diversity of vocabulary he employs, Kant's stance has an underlying consistency that is overlooked. Kant never articulated his prior reasons for embracing Baumgarten's broader definition of "aesthetic," despite the fact that he later adopted this definition. Kant argues and underlines in Criticism of Judgment Power that "there is no science [Wissenschaft] of the beautiful, but simply criticism." This argument is repeated again in the Appendix, in sections 44, "On Fine Art," and 60, "On Taste Methodology." He asserts that a science of beauty is impossible and does not exist (Giotgio, 1998). In other words, neither it nor an aesthetic philosophy can exist. Instead, Kant's viewpoint has evolved to demonstrate the methodical character of "criticism." Criticism is applied in this instance without consideration to dogma (Lehre), "science" (as interpreted by doctrine), or "the empirical." Instead of the application of a priori rules to particular cases or the evaluation of such rules by particular cases (Kant's earlier emphasis), the concept of "critique of taste" is now understood in terms of the immanent idea of transcendental critique, which guided the Critique of Pure Reason from its inception. Under the banner of "criticism of reason by reason alone," it is a transcendental critique of aesthetic judgment-power (Urteilkraft). This is not a critique of specific judgments, but rather a critique of a given capacity for judgment. There is only transcendental criticism of what are essentially solitary, radical empirical judgements of the beautiful, but there is no critique of the substance of these judgments.

This distinctively Kantian conception of philosophy as a critical attitude transcending positive "criteria" or positive knowledge, but which is yet fundamentally reflective and no longer metaphysically self-sufficient as rational doctrine, is very favorable to Romanticism. Karl Ameriks has noted that the emergence of a shared "Kantian-Romantic worldview" is predicated on the more well-known Kantian concept of the "limits" of reason (Smith, 2006). Kant is seen able to legally transcend the cognitive restrictions of reason as a "standpoint," but never as a doctrine, in accordance with the immanently transcendental criticism approach. The aesthetic judgment-power criticism conceptualizes this perspective as the enjoyable knowledge of the unity of subjectivity that results from self-reflective awareness. In a new post-critical metaphysics of art, the Romantics developed the notion of "going beyond" further.

However, it does not seem that Kant's formal consistency is adequate to address his previous criticism of the too-modern sense of the term "aesthetic," which he said departed too far from "the language and passion of the ancients." This perspective is adopted by a transcendental criticism of the structure of judgment, which abstracts from any concretely sensory particularity (that is, it conceptualizes sensuous particularity in terms of its logical singularity). Consequently, it is not really "aesthetic" in the sense that Kant meant for the phrase "things of experience." However, as "pure intuitions," space and time are likewise beautiful in their own right. Transcendental critique of taste is not "aesthetic" in the sense that "things of sensibility" and "things of intellect" may be differentiated from one another; rather, it is the critique of a certain kind of judgmentpower. The distinction between *aisthéta* and *noéta* dissolves in pure aesthetic judgments of taste.

What is the ultimate goal of Kant's transcendental explanation of taste judgments in terms of the reflective connections between cognitive processes? Leaving aside language formalities, which at this point appear pedantically rigid and (as Hegel put it) "a mere name," what is the purpose of Kant's explanation of taste judgments in terms of the reflective connections between cognitive processes?

Kant's Third Critique expanded the term of "aesthetic" to include the sentiments that accompany relations of reflection, which are fundamental to the underlying cognitive structure of subjectivity itself. This development goes beyond only distinguishing the sensible (spatial and temporal) characteristics of the "outer" and "inner" intuition's objects. What else could this possibly be but a romanticized aesthetic? Kant's first allusion to the conventional distinction between *aisthéta* and *noéta* is evidently the linguistic register of a dualistic rationality that he has since been able to transcend. Contrary to Aristotle's belief that each sense represents a distinct judgment, human sensibility is fundamentally interconnected and irreducibly judgemental. The ontological particularity of human subjectivity, the major conceptual wellspring of Heidegger's early existentialism, is the focus of this brand-new philosophical research. Kant's use of language helped to conceive this change by broadening the notion of "aesthetic" to encompass the paradoxical pure "self-affection" of human subjectivity (Giorgio, 2013). This is far from fitting the philological definition of "ignorance."

What about "the object," or taste criticism as it was known in England at the time, the things to which the newly expanded philosophical notion of "aesthetic" must also refer? Kant maintains that aesthetic subjectivity is only capable of experiencing itself through taste assessments generated by the "quickening" of objects.

Now, the insulting accusation of "ignorance" has a more precise sense. Due to Kant's later, dialectically ambiguous sense of aesthetics, the problem isn't so much the expansion of sensibility to encompass the subject's relationship to themselves, or auto-affection, as it is the resulting principled indifference to the character of the objects that occasion judgement; specifically, it is the principled indifference to the cognitive, relational, historical, and world-revealing dimensions of works of art, which were so important to Kant.

Kant is known for expressing the clear declaration that perspectives on art cannot be reduced to solely aesthetic judgements of taste. Kant deliberately excludes from aesthetics those

evaluations that historically have made up the bulk of the criticism of taste as a critical discourse owing to the transcendentalism of his technique. These may only be understood within the context of Kant's underdeveloped and underestimated idea of "logically conditioned" aesthetic assessments, or those that are not aesthetically "pure" owing to the limits imposed by a certain category, such as "art" or "painting." Kant asserts that artistic beauty can never be "free" or "purely aesthetic," but can only be "accessory" or adherent (at least not as an expression of artistic beauty) (Ferrari, 2010). He chastised Baumgarten for earlier using the word "aesthetic" in regard to this concept. As a result, Kant's ideas fail to bridge the conceptual gap between aesthetics and art. When "aesthetics" is used to describe the philosophical investigation of art, we are faced with a new and equally absurd "ignorance of the object and of the word": aesthetics' principled ignorance of art (Dumbadze, 2013). Kant easily accepts that "aesthetic" alone cannot distinguish art from nature, even when it seems to be a "product of ordinary nature" (Nancy, 1993). In addition, Kantian aesthetic judgment only requires this "as if" analysis and disregards the ontological and epistemological dimensions of illusion. By limiting "fine" or "beautiful" art to a kind of "aesthetic art," Kant disregards the vast majority of what has always been and will always be most significant about art (his own term). It may be distinguished from nature based on its philosophical, cognitive, and politico-ideological functions as art.

The "art as aesthetic" tradition of the 19th and 20th centuries, sometimes known as "artistic aestheticism," is founded on an inaccurate and contradictory absolutization of Kant's concept of "aesthetic art." In this view, "aesthetics" is more than just a "label," contrary to Hegel's acceptance of it as such: It legitimizes and guarantees the exclusion of other characteristics of art from the philosophical concept of art by limiting art to a single level of relevance, namely its capacity to appear as "a product of plain nature" and hence to be the subject of only aesthetic judgments. This issue constraints even Kant's concept of genius, which would ordinarily be rather advantageous for a post-Kantian, Romantic aesthetic. This lack of comprehension of the concept of "art" may be summed up by the ignorance of language that thinks "aesthetics" is the correct term for the philosophical investigation of art. This popular fallacy asserts that the intellectual foundation for the autonomy of art is the logical independence of pure aesthetic judgments of taste from other sorts of assessment (as proposed by Kant). By employing the term "aesthetic autonomy" to characterize the autonomy of art, even authors with a strong grasp of German philosophy, such as Andrew Bowie and Jay Bernstein, have contributed to the dissemination of this mistake to the point that it has become a philosophical cliché. Theoretically, Kant's work cannot serve as the intellectual foundation for an explanation of the autonomy of the artwork since he does not explain (and shows no interest in) the ontological singularity of the artwork. That was Jena Romanticism's contribution.

This is not the appropriate moment to discuss Fichte's effort to build a fundamental philosophy of the subject and how the inclusion of poetic meaning generated problems and gave birth to the Romantic notion of the independent work of art. In regard to Kant, it is essential to remember three aspects of the Romantic perspective on art: 1) Its "denunciation" of the distinction between free and accessory beauty as "invalid and as originating from too narrow

and too low a judgment of the beautiful" (Jones, 2016); 2) Its development at a concrete-historical level of a metaphysically based conception of art - as Schelling's "organon of philosophy" (Jones, 2016) - not as a medium-based system of the arts, but as a philosophically constructed (negative) theory of genres. A historical-ontological theory of art, which incorporates transcendental, metaphysical, and (unlike its Heideggerian counterpart) concretely historical features, is the last component of the Romantic philosophy of art that functions as its mediating core (Danto, 1964). This philosophical perspective is shared by Romantic literary forms such as poetry and the novel, as well as post-conceptual art and what Thierry de Duve would term "generic" art. True; they are "constantly becoming" certain genres (Groys, 2010).

The structure of an apparently unsolvable metaphysical problem (the infinite reflexivity of a self-positing subject) is displaced into a particular type of object, rendering the autonomous work of art irreducibly conceptual - and metaphysical - in its philosophical structure, as well as historically and "aesthetic" in its mode of presentation (art). It is thus incorrect to believe that "aesthetic" has no place in it since it is conceptual. Aesthetics and the ontological view of art maintained by the early Romantics, which aesthetics defines as the essential sensuality of presentation, are inseparable. From an ontological viewpoint, however, it is relational and incomplete. Given the historically fluctuating relationships between aesthetic and other characteristics of artworks, such as their cognitive, semantic, social, political, and ideological components, aesthetic's artistic value must be evaluated. The relevancy and harmony of different art forms will likewise vary. Through their ties to other (non-art) cultural forms that share similar historically flexible aesthetic characteristics, the aesthetic and other components of an artwork develop its critical importance. These other cultural forms include all non-art components of visual culture, such as advertising, mass media, communications technology, product design, and display. One issue with the philosophical concept of "art as aesthetic" is that it limits awareness of these linkages as basic to the structure of the artwork, making it impossible to comprehend some of the most critical, anti-aesthetic, and historical parts of contemporary art.

Since the end of the eighteenth century, "art as aesthetic" and "art as (historical) ontology" have coexisted and been at war with one another. This concise reconstruction of the conceptual foundation has enabled us to differentiate between these two traditions, despite their substantial overlap. Before discussing 19th-century aestheticism (Baudelaire, Pater, and Wilde), the author links Kant to subsequent works by Greenberg (which mark the aestheticist collapse of his earlier historical self-understanding). It is based on an aesthetic philosophy of the arts with origins in Renaissance realism and the burgeoning area of optics (Groys, 2010). Its central tenet is an empirical reduction of Kant's transcendentalism to psychology of perception, or at most, phenomenology, for which Wollheim was the foremost contemporary figure (Ranciere, 2004). The second branch has intellectual Romanticist origins and reaches conceptual art and its results through Hegel, Duchamp, surrealism, and the revolutionary Romanticism of constructivism. I like to refer to this period as the transmedia condition of post-conceptual art. It is referred to by Rosalind Krauss as "the post-medium situation."

Lessing's media aesthetic theory serves as the basis for the particular critical language of the first lineage (aesthetic). Jay Bernstein is now revisiting T.J. Clarke's interpretation of Jackson Pollock via immanent critique but in a more overtly Kantian, transcendental version, as the philosophical foundation for a theory of modernism as the embodiment of nature's resistance to history in culture. Avant-gardist constitutive negation, which determines artistic meaning as a determination of contemporaneity itself—a philosophically negative theory of the "truth of art" that historically manifests this negativity in the concept of "the new"—provides the critical terms for the second (historical-ontological) tradition (Ranciere, 1991). It draws a substantial portion of its empirical content from a general concept of art that stresses the historical present from the perspective of a totalizing (negative) future since it is historically totalizing while being theoretically open to history. In this instance, the philosophical processes of historical totalization as a whole generate the qualitative historical temporality of art-critical judgment. This second Romantic or generic avant-gardist tradition emerged in response to historical shifts in the institutional frameworks for artistic autonomy (which establish the social conditions necessary for the possibility of autonomous meaning production) and socially progressive political cultures that have criticized the dominant social forms of autonomy, particularly their incorrect labeling as "aesthetic." The contemporary manifestation of post-conceptual art is its anti-aestheticism (Foucault, 1977).

But what is post-conceptual art exactly? What characteristic of modern art does it define? What, if anything, can be drawn (or should be derived) about "the art history that art criticism is" from this comparison of "post-conceptual" and "modern" works? - to return to the assertions made in Rosenberg's statement, where I started.

Conclusion

Due to its historical shift from the notion of an absolute anti-aesthetic to the acceptance of its own inevitable pictorialism, contextual art is the preferred form of mediation; in fact, it is the art in relation to which the conflict over the potentials and meanings of contemporary art will be waged. If my contention about the critical-historical primacy of conceptual art is accepted, then a critical historical experience of contemporary art is only feasible in connection to the category of conceptual art, in its intrinsic problematic nature. According to this theory, "post-conceptual art" more accurately refers to a historical-ontological context for the development of contemporary art as a whole or work that may maintain the theoretically based concepts of "art" and "current."

Post-conceptual art may be used to describe the contemporaneity of "contemporary art" due to its distillation and reflection of the historical experience of conceptual art in connection to contemporary art practices. Consequently, it requires consideration of all lower-level fundamental categories in order to be understood on a more concrete level. The purpose of critique is to provide such a comprehensive totality of categories. However, what ultimately determines their significance is the contribution these categories make to the future-oriented retrospective totalization in which they are incorporated. This essay proposes that "an art history of the qualitative historical temporality of the new" is the ideal art history. Art

criticism's (ideal) art history is a modernist art history of the qualitatively historically new, of the novelty of the present from which the past must be recreated and made accessible.

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